Démocratisation de la science : questions épistémologiques et perspectives nouvelles

Democratisation of science : epistemological issues and new perspectives

Conférenciers invités/Invited speakers
- **Sara Aguiton** (CNRS/Centre Alexandre Koyré)
- **Cécile Blatrix** (AgroParisTech)
- **Mark B. Brown** (California State University)
- **Jaana Eigi** (Tartu University)
- **David Guston** (Arizona State University)
- **Janet Kourany** (University of Notre Dame)
- **Séverine Louvel** (SciencePo Grenoble)
- **Roger Pielke Jr.** (University of Colorado Boulder)
- **Hans Radder** (VU University Amsterdam)
- **Julian Reiss** (Durham University)
- **Torsten Wilholt** (Leibniz Universität Hannover)

28 MAI
Salle Caillemer
15 Quai Claude Bernard
69007 Lyon

29/30 MAI
Salle de la Rotonde
8 rue chevreul
69007 Lyon

Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3

Organisé par / organized by
Stéphanie Ruphy (Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3)
Baptiste Bedessem (Université Grenoble Alpes)

Programme détaillé/detailed programme : www.democrasci.com

UNIVERSITÉ LYON III
JEAN MOULIN

IRPhiL Institut de Recherches Philosophiques de Lyon

The workshop “Democratisation of science” is financially supported by:

-The *Agence nationale de la recherche*, project “Democrasci” 14-CE31-0003

- Université Jean-Moulin Lyon 3

- Institut de Recherches Philosophiques de Lyon

Contents

General information

About the Workshop

The two-and-a-half day workshop will start on Monday 28 May, at 1 pm and end on Wednesday late afternoon (around 7 pm).

Location: Université Jean-Moulin Lyon 3, Campus des Quais. The campus is situated in the center of the city of Lyon, France. Website: http://www.univ-lyon3.fr/welcome-to-jean-moulin-lyon-3-university-931913.kjsp?RH=INS-ACCUEIL&RF=INS-ACCUEIL_EN

On **Monday, May 28th** the presentations will take place at the Salle Caillemer, **15 Quai Claude Bernard, first floor.**

On **Tuesday, May 29th** the presentations will take place at the Amphithéâtre Huvelin, **15 Quai Claude Bernard, ground floor.**

On **Wednesday, May 29th** the presentations will take place at the Salle Vincent, **15 Quai Claude Bernard, Aile Nord, first floor.**

The lunch and coffee breaks will take place at the Salle de la Rotonde, **18 Rue Chevreul, sixth floor** or at the Salle des professeurs, **15 Quai Claude Bernard, first floor**.

Both the Quai Claude Bernard and the Rue Chevreul are located in the 7th district of Lyon, near the subway stations "Guillotière" (line D) and "Saxe-Gambetta" (line D and B).



To contact the organizers:

- Baptiste Bedessem: +33 (0)6 19 21 63 45
- Stéphanie Ruphy: + 33 (0)6 78 59 21 78
- Romain Carnevali: +33 (0)4 78 78 73 94

About Lyon

The 2,000 years old city of Lyon is famous for its historical heritage and for its art of fine living. It offers a large variety of museums and architectural styles, from the Roman vestiges in Fourvière to the charming streets and "traboules" passageways of the Vieux-Lyon Renaissance district.

As one of the capital of French gastronomy, Lyon is also known for its typical "bouchon" restaurants, some of them being Michelin-starred.

You will find much useful information about what to do and what to eat in Lyon at http://www.onlylyon.com/en/

Public transport: Lyon has a dense network of public transport, buses, tramway and subway. You may find maps and practical information at http://www.tcl.fr/en

To get to the city center from the airport, you may take the Rhône Express train up to the Gare Part-Dieu train station, where you will find the subway (line B).

Programme

Monday, May 28th

Salle Caillemer, 15 Quai Claude Bernard, first floor

13h00-13h30 Registration and opening

13h30-14h45

Roger Pielke (University of Colorado Boulder)
Scientific Authority and Political Myth

14h45-15h15

Alain-Marc Rieu (Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3)
Science and democracy: the missing nexus

15h15-15h45

Evaldas Juozelis (Mykolas Romeris University Vilnius)
Legitimacy of Science Autonomy: Three Options, Two Ontologies, One perspective

15h45-16h05

Coffee break

16h05-16h35

Laura Rodriguez (Institut des sciences de l'évolution, Montpellier)
Scientific ecology in environmental impact assessment: tensions between scientific imperative and deliberative imperative

16h35-17h05

Hugh Lacey (Swarthmore College)
Democracy and methodological pluralism

17h05-18h20

Hans Radder (Vrije University Amsterdam)
Which scientific knowledge is a common good?

18h20-20h

Welcoming wine reception

Salle des professeurs, 15 Quai Claude Bernard, first floor

Tuesday, May 29th

Amphithéâtre Huvelin, 15 Quai Claude Bernard, ground floor

9h-10h

Julian Reiss (Durham University)
Fact-Value Entanglement and Other Reasons for the Dearth of Uncontroversial Social Scientific Knowledge

10h-10h30

Teresa Yolande Branch-Smith (University of Waterloo)
The Value-Free Ideal in Science Communication

10h30-11h

Caglar Dede (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
Well-ordered Nudges

11h-11h20

Coffee break

11h20-12h20

Torsten Wilholt (Leibniz University Hannover)
What Is a University, and Do We Need It?

12h20-13h30

Lunch break (buffet, Salle de la Rotonde, 18 rue Chevreul, sixth floor)

13h30-14h30

Jaana Eigi (Tartu University)
Objectivity, participation, democracy: bringing together Helen Longino's ideas about objectivity and analyses of democratic participatory practices

14h30-15h

Stéphanie Debray (Université de Lorraine)
Academic Consensus, Interface Consensus, and Decision-making procedures: When should we consider citizen discourse in scientific deliberation?

15h-15h30

Inkeri Koskinen (University of Helsinki)
Epistemic success and societal impact in extra-academic collaboration

15h30-15h50

Coffee break

15h50-16h20

Haris Shekeris (Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3)
CIVISTI and the ideal conversation: A comparison of two modes of setting the scientific research agenda

16h20-16h50

Renaud Fine (Université Grenoble Alpes)
Ordinary citizens vs. Stakeholders: which 'public' should participate in well-ordered science?

16h50-18h05

David Guston (Arizona State University)
Frankenstein and Democracy

Wednesday, May 30th

Salle Vincent, 15 Quai Claude Bernard, Aile Nord, first floor

9h-10h

Sara Aguiton (CNRS/Centre Alexandre Koyré)
The politics of Technical Democracy. Social sciences, protest movements and technoscientific powers in the transformations of public participation in France

10h-11h

Cécile Blatrix (AgroParisTech)
Twenty years of citizen conferences in France: What assessment can be made?

11h-11h20

Coffee break

11h20-12h20

Séverine Louvel (SciencesPo Grenoble)
Do funding agencies foster the convergence of the epistemic commitments of scientists? Insights from interdisciplinary nanomedicine in France and in the United States

12h20-13h30

Lunch break (buffet, Salle des professeurs, 15 Quai Claude Bernard, first floor)

13h30-14h45

Janet Kourany (University of Notre-Dame)
Bacon's Promise

15h45-16h15

Léo Coutellec (Université Paris-Sud)
Epistemological characteristics of the implicated science. Issues for the research on Alzheimer's disease

16h15-16h45

Jorrit Smit (Leiden University)
Utility as epistemology: a pragmatist take on science policy

16h45-17h

Coffee break

17h-18h15

Mark Brown (California State University)
Expertise, Populism, and White Identity Politics

18h15-19h

Bubbles and Goodbyes (salle des professeurs, 15 Quai Claude Bernard, first floor)

ABSTRACTS

Aguiton, S.

The politics of Technical Democracy. Social sciences, protest movements and technoscientific powers in the transformations of public participation in France

Since the 1990's, discourses and apparatuses designed to foster public participation in science flourished in Europe. The model of "technical democracy" (Callon, Lascoumes, Barthe, 2001) was described as an innovative institutional framework contributing to new relationships between "science and society" through participatory and dialogic apparatus. But far from this ideal representation, twenty years later, the status of technical democracy is critical: when public participation in science is organized, it is largely ignored by scientific institutions and administrations and contested by participants and protesters. In parallel, an enthusiasm for "citizen science" is rising, in the same circles that previously celebrated the model of technical democracy. To understand such mutations, I propose to discuss the politics of participation in science by exploring the case of synthetic biology in France, which is symptomatic of changes within the mode of governing "through" participation. I will first focus on the institutionalization of the model of technical democracy over the last twenty years in Europe, suggesting the important yet understudied role of small networks of social scientists, NGO activists and administrative bodies committed to the fostering of "sciences-society relationships". I will then suggest that these networks have failed in reforming technoscientific institutions, which never meant to redistribute their power of decision over sciences and technologies. The case of public participation in synthetic biology (where "technical democracy" apparatus was set up and contested) illustrates how this model reached the limits of its promises because of too unequal power repartitions; and how the early passions for "citizen sciences" replaced it – more conciliating because in its framing, the question of political power is easier to ignored.

Blatrix, C.

Twenty years of citizen conferences in France: What assessment can be made?

Since 1998 – when the first citizens' conference was organized in France, on the use of GMOs in agriculture (Boy, Donnet-Kamel, Roqueplo, 2000; Marris, Joly: 2000), we have observed the development of such experiments initiated not only by public authorities, but by private firms, local authorities and NGOs. After a brief overview of the French context regarding public participation, we will discuss the various assumptions on which the success of citizen conferences relies, as they are promoted as a way to democratize both decision-making processes and scientific issues.Then we will try to give an assessment of the use of citizen conferences from 1998 to present. To what extent did citizen conferences lead to changes in science and technology issues ? Public participation tools in general remain barely evaluated, even if recently a cluster of studies has focused on this question, and various evaluation frameworks have been proposed. When assessments are available, however, procedural dimensions remain their main focus while the more substantive outcomes are often simply ignored. Among the numerous evaluation frameworks suggested, David Guston (1999) is one of the very few authors who focuses on the issue of the assessment not only of the procedural quality of the process, but on the different kinds of impacts it can have. He stresses that apart from the actual impact on policies or decisions (budget, regulations, etc), there can be impacts on general thinking, framing of the issue, public knowledge and political

agendas in general. This is the framework we will use for our assessment, based on which we shall discuss the reasons why this device is actually promoted by various kind of public and private actors.

Branch-Smith, T-Y.

The Value-Free Ideal in Science Communication

In order for democracy to function effectively, publics must be well informed. In our increasingly technoscientific world, science communication becomes an integral part in making sure publics are scientifically literate. Despite acknowledging the importance of public understanding of science, science literacy levels remain relatively low. I argue that part of the reason science communication has failed to improve public understanding of science is because, like science itself, it has been operating under the value-free ideal (VFI). The value-free ideal (VFI), the idea that non-epistemic values should not play a role in the evaluation of evidence (Douglas, 2009), misrepresents science for several reasons. First, it suggests that by only using epistemic values during the evaluation of evidence, we will produce 'good' science. However, feminist scholars have shown that science under the VFI can still produce gaping oversights because of scientists' inevitable reliance on background assumptions. Second, it is not clear which values should be considered epistemic, and if the distinction cannot be made, then the VFI fails. Third, a challenge to the ideal qua ideal, is that there may be cases where it is desirable for non-epistemic values to play a role, especially when considering inductive risk. Thus, the VFI in advocating for only epistemic values, ends up masking the important and sometimes desirable role, that non-epistemic values can play in science. In contribution to the discourse, I argue that the adoption of the VFI in science has lead to encouraging models of communication that make science appear to be 'value-free'. Overall I am critical of these models on practical and normative grounds because they are misrepresentative of science and ineffective for public uptake of science. The practical and normative challenges to value-free communication extend directly from challenges to the VFI. Practically, from the descriptive challenge to the VFI, the ubiquitousness of values in science makes value-free communication seem unattainable. From the normative VFI challenge, value-free communication is troublesome because in many situations we might want to include nonepistemic values to ensure communication is produced in the best interests of publics. Lastly in terms of instrumental efficacy, given the evidence that contextualized information is more readily retained, I argue that the positive aspects to using value-free communication (e.g. assessment speed) come at the expense of science uptake - making it self-defeating. As an alternative, I suggest that science communicators need to convey the value-laden processes, practices and products of science. As a result of using models of science communication that include values, the actual practice of science can be more accurately represented, more readily apt for the uptake of science, and can include more epistemic diversity. In turn, science communicators are in a better position to not only improve public understanding of science but strengthen democracy by providing publics the information needed for personal and civic decision-making.

Brown, M-B.

Expertise, Populism, and White Identity Politics

The legitimacy of modern democracies depends on balancing diverse elements, including scientific expertise, political participation, and public representativeness. The growing influence of authoritarian populism in Europe and the United States is undermining efforts to balance these elements. Authoritarian populists have recruited followers in part by challenging established expertise on topics such as vaccines and climate change. And they have resisted efforts to make public institutions more broadly representative of all residents, often by appealing to dominant racial, ethnic, and religious identities. In this respect, populism today amounts to a form of identity politics: white identity politics. More broadly, authoritarian populists make explicit what has long been obvious to many nonwhites: modern Western democracies, founded on racialized slavery and colonialism, have been basically white democracies. Those socially defined as white have enjoyed systematic advantages over nonwhites, and many of the basic values and institutions of modern science and democracy have reflected and enabled white supremacy, intertwined with gender, class, and other forms of power. To be sure, racial politics in the United States cannot be equated with debates over *Zwarte Piet* in the Netherlands, migrants in Germany, or headscarves in France. Nonetheless, commonalities appear in certain aspects of authoritarian populism, and also in the aspirational color-blindness of many white liberals. The latter often portray themselves as the racially unmarked guardians of universal ideals of science and democracy, implicitly reinforcing whiteness as the unspoken standard to which nonwhites are expected to aspire. The racism of dominant scientific and political institutions has been repeatedly challenged, of course, not only by racialized minorities but also by some whites. Whites who fight racism, not just as individuals but as whites, suggest the possibility of antiracist forms of white identity politics. This presentation will examine different versions of populism and white identity politics, focusing on their implications for the politics of science and expertise.

Coutellec, L.

Epistemological characteristics of the implicated science.
Issues for the research on Alzheimer's disease

Nous proposons d'appeler « science impliquée », une conception non-standard de la science qui vise à rompre avec l'illusion de la neutralité, l'illusion de l'autonomie et l'irresponsabilité. Trois caractéristiques épistémologiques sont associées à une telle conception des sciences : (i) La reconnaissance du *pluralisme épistémique* (Ruphy 2013) qui nous engage à rediscuter la place respective des disciplines et des objets dans le processus de production des connaissances scientifiques (Coutellec 2012) ; (ii) La mise en œuvre d'une *justice épistémique* (Sousa Santos 2016 ; Fricker 2009) qui nous engage à redéfinir les critères d'évaluation des connaissances au carrefour de la robustesse (méthodologique), de la pertinence (sociale) et de la légitimité (politique) ; (iii) La mise en œuvre d'une *responsabilité épistémique* (Coutellec 2015) qui nous engage à investir la question des valeurs et des finalités de la science, et à imaginer des mécanismes de *vigilance*, de *réveil* et de *réflexivité* permettant de limiter l'irresponsabilité parfois avérée de la recherche scientifique. Nous détaillerons ces trois dimensions de la science impliquée - pluralisation, dé-hiérarchisation, responsabilisation – puis évaluerons dans quelle mesure elles affaiblissent ou renforcent la possibilité d'une recherche scientifique pertinente dans le domaine de la maladie d'Alzheimer. Ce sera pour nous l'occasion de partager quatre années d'observations et d'analyses dans le champ de l'anticipation de la maladie d'Alzheimer (Coutellec & al. 2018).

Debray, S.

Academic Consensus, Interface Consensus, and Decision-making procedures: When should we consider citizen discourse in scientific deliberation?

Kosolosky and Bouwel (2014) distinguish mainly two different types of consensus: the « *academic consensus* » (established by scientists on a specific subject) and the « *interface consensus* » (established at the boundary between science and society). As they noticed, they are indeed different approaches, which imply 1° different goals - on the one hand we aim for an internal result in the scientific community and its practice, on the other hand we want to take into account the other spheres of the society ; 2° different actors - in the academic world everyone would be on an equal footing and would serve as authority in his own field, on the contrary, interface consensus include different types of actors : scientists, experts, interest groups, citizens or their representatives. According to them, we must study these two types of consensus distinctly because values such as authority, trust, mutual respect, ethical and social consequences take part in our decisions on the second one - the individuals in the group are no longer on an equal footing. We will explain why this distinction is too strong and needs to be refined. But, the purpose of this presentation will be to show that this distinction allows us to examine the fertility of the scientific / citizen relationship. I will argue that, *depending on the decisionmaking procedures adopted, non-academic discourse can harm, or conversely serve, reflection and deliberation in the academic world*. This will involve determining the cases and conditions in which this type of discourse is harmful or fruitful. To illustrate our considerations, we will focus in particular on the dialogue that takes place between our two authors, and Miriam Solomon, about consensus conferences in the medical field. According to Solomon, they bring us nothing more. They are, in a way, rituals, simple choreographies that make official decisions already accepted in the academic world. Yet, they can sometimes be beneficial and greatly participate in academic thinking (Beatty, J., and A. Moore : 2010, Kosolosky, L., and J. V. Bouwel : 2014). As experts, scientists have certain responsibilities to the public and society, and one of the major challenges they face today and in the future is to improve this scientific / public relationship (Douglas, 2009) for the successful development of the social sphere, but also as we shall see, science.

Dede, C.

Well-ordered Nudges

The justification of evidence-based policies faces a challenge from democracy (Kitcher 2011, Anderson 2011, Elliot and MacKaughan 2013, John 2017). While evidence-based policies should fulfill their pragmatic function (that is to perform cogent evaluations of technical and expertise-requiring issues), it should do so by taking citizens' values into account, without bypassing their autonomy. Behavioral public policies such as nudges (Sunstein and Thaler 2008), boosts (Hertwig and Grüne-Yanoff 2017), and incentivized behavior change programmes (Chater and Loewenstein 2017) are all instances of evidence-based policies. Hence they face the challenge from democracy. Indeed, the challenge is even more stringent for behavioral policies than many other evidence-based policies because these policies have a direct impact on our choices and decision-making processes. Nudges, as a popular type of behavioral policy, and accompanied ideal of "libertarian paternalism" seem to offer a unique response to the challenge from democracy. Based on scientific evidence assembled in decision sciences such as behavioral economics, nudges steer citizens' choices through subtle interventions to the choice environments. Nudges aim at changing citizens' behavior in directions that *these citizens would endorse*, had they been free from cognitive biases and had sufficient resources to deliberate over their decisions. The proponents of libertarian paternalism argue that carefully designed and implemented nudges respect the autonomy of citizens. Nevertheless, the ethical foundations and the political character of nudges remain

controversial (see Barton and Grüne-Yanoff 2016 for a review). As such, how nudges and their justification are embedded in democratic institutional procedures are also ambiguous. Therefore, nudges are both praised and cursed for realizing (and not realizing) democratic ideals, and the commentators in the literature have different intuitions regarding how nudges relate to democratic ideals and procedures (see, for instance, Schiavone et al. 2013, Waldron 2014, Sunstein 2017, Nys and Engelen 2017). In this paper, I focus on the implications of Philip Kitcher's 2011 ideal of well-ordered science for the evaluations of nudges as evidence-based policies (see Schiavone et al. 2013 for a partial attempt). Kitcher's framework provides us with a democratic norm in which citizens and scientific experts interact in order to determine the non-epistemic value-content of scientific projects, including that of evidence-based policy evaluations. In the context of behavioral policies, Kitcher's ideal specifies a democratic procedure regarding how non-epistemic value considerations in evaluating nudges should be identified. I distinguish between evidence-based evaluations of nudges from the design of nudges, and focus only on the former. I list Kitcher's criteria for evidence-based evaluations of nudges and define *well-ordered nudges* as those nudges that are evaluated following Kitcher's criteria. I then make use of the ideal of well-ordered nudges to illuminate subtle differences among the commentators in the literature regarding their presuppositions on the norms of scientific assertion in a democratic evaluation of nudge. Some commentators do not include norms of scientific assertion in their democracy-based defenses of nudges (e.g. Schmidt 2017, Nys and Engelen 2017). Others seem to disagree on whether the norms of scientific assertion in the context of evaluating nudges should aim at improving the *epistemic* or the *non-epistemic* position of the nudgees (e.g. Sunstein, Grüne-Yanoff). The discussion also has implications for the ethics and the methodology of conducting empirical studies on the acceptability of nudges (Sunstein 2015, Tenneabaum et al. 2016).

Eigi, J.

Objectivity, participation, democracy: bringing together Helen Longino's ideas about objectivity and analyses of democratic participatory practices

I have previously argued that there may be seen some parallels between philosophical proposals about the social organisation of science and developments towards a greater democratisation of science policy. In the presentation, I summarise my argument that there are important similarities between one approach to objectivity in philosophy of science—Helen Longino's account of objectivity as freedom from individual biases achieved through interaction of a variety of perspectives—and some ideas about the epistemic benefits of wider representation of various groups' perspectives in science policy, as analysed by Mark Brown. Given these similarities, I suggest that they allow one to approach developments in science policy as if one of their aims were epistemic improvement that can be recommended on the basis of the philosophical account. Analyses of political developments inspired by these ideas about the benefits of inclusive dialogue can then be used for understanding possibilities for implementing a philosophical proposal to improve the objectivity of science in practice. Accordingly, analysing such specific developments can be one of the tasks for philosophy of science. In the second part of the presentation, I discuss some analyses of participatory practices that since then have made me rethink some aspects of the relation between the epistemic and the democratic in the vision of public participation inspired by Longino's ideas. Several analyses of participatory practices have identified different types of the public that such initiatives seek to engage. One of the most important contrasts here is between representatives of the public invited for their knowledge, experience and relevant perspectives—„lay experts" —and representatives of the „pure public" meant to represent ordinary citizens. I suggest that it is useful to recognise Longino's account as supporting the first type of public participation. Analyses of participatory practices demonstrate some difficulties that may arise when trying to organise participation of different types of the

public. In particular, the qualities required for a successful "lay expert" may be incompatible with the qualities of a "pure citizen" and acquiring these qualities may undermine one's credibility as a representative of the general citizenry. I still believe that some participatory practices involving "lay experts" combine epistemic and democratic rationales in a way that makes them relevant for understanding the practical promise of philosophical proposals and that can be characterised as democratisation of science and science policy. At the same time, being aware of different types of participation and different types of the public is important for understanding the kind of democratisation that proposals based on Longino's ideas can support.

Fine, R.

Ordinary citizens vs. Stakeholders: which 'public' should participate in well-ordered science?

My aim in this talk will be to explore ways to have a concrete influence on the shaping of the politicization of science and push it towards a more democratic direction, with a focus on the institutionalized modes of public participation to the definition of the research agenda.I investigate those questions through the prism of the 'public' supposed to participate: how does the way it is conceived of influence the potential applicability of the normative philosophical accounts of the democratization of science? My intuition, and the thesis I want to expose and defend, is that the conception mobilized by one of the main proposals articulated this way, Philip Kitcher's ideal of a *well-ordered science* (2001, 2011), is what ultimately prevents it from being ever successfully translated into facts. I will argue that it can therefore be seen as what I want to call a *counter-ideal*, namely: a theory which, if applied, would ineluctably backfire and lead to an aggravation of the very problems it intends to solve. My argument builds on the classical distinction made by sociological and socio-epistemological accounts of public engagement between the figure of the *general public*, and that of the *stakeholder* (Lezaun et Soneryd 2007; Irwin 2006; Levidow et Marris 2001) to show that adopting one or the other has straightforward consequences on the concrete design of processes intended to implement them. The *ordinary citizen*, a disembodied individual able to think and act under a rawlsian *veil of ignorance* (Rawls 1971), appears to be the key element leading to the institutionalization of the classical (Fiorino 1990), objectivist and discursive forms of public deliberation (Marres 2007) where participants are randomly chosen in order to best approximate this figure (Fishkin 2009). The random selection of participants, however, is inevitably bound to leave aside people that do not constitute a significant fraction of society in terms of shared socio-demographic criteria, but are substantially more affected by the decision to be taken, and have way more at stake on those issues (Westphal 2014). Participative politics thus conceived have indeed more to do with tools in the engineering of the public acceptance of science (Levidow et Marris 2001; Felt et al. 2007) than with the idea of building a more active citizenship, and the institution of such processes is more than often used as a way to play against spontaneous associative mobilization (Bonneuil et Joly 2013; Lezaun et Soneryd 2007). Absorbed into disciplinary regimes of governmentality (Pestre 2008; Foucault 2004), deliberative forums are turned into new instruments of government (Rosanvallon 2008; Topcu 2013), and foster the very tensions they aim at alleviating. The concrete application of model such as Kitcher's would therefore very likely lead to excluding the most affected from the deliberation, reducing the participative options offered to stakeholders, and potentially aggravating the problem of unidentifiable oppression he aims at solving.

Guston, D.

Frankenstein and Democracy

While Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* is a work of literature, and perhaps even the first work of science fiction, it is also a deeply political work. The action in the novel is timed to events in the French Revolution, and the issues explored express anxieties related to the gathering Industrial Revolution. The novel touches on Rousseau's political theories and issues of slavery and colonialism that rived Shelley's England. Even the creature itself – normally understood as a technological creation – can and has been taken as a metaphor for the things that people create politically, like states and corporations. This presentation will explore a variety of such political aspects of *Frankenstein*, relating them to the enduring value of the novel in this, its two-hundredth year.

Juozelis, E.

Legitimacy of Science Autonomy: Three Options, Two Ontologies, One perspective.

In my talk I will present three philosophical conceptions of science autonomy: Steve Fuller's *social eliminativism*, Joseph Rouse's *deflationism* and Dimitri Ginev's *cognitive existentialism*. Each of them provides an epistemic toolkit for the political legitimacy of science. Ontologically, these three options indicate two competing worldviews: Fuller and Rouse propagate a certain kind (though different types) of moderate naturalism, while Ginev holds onto phenomenological hermeneutics. However, our naturalists draw entirely different conclusions about the autonomy of science: Fuller's legitimation project tends to authorize "non-epistemic" means for the justification of scientific knowledge that result from an accountability to certain social norms and are consistent with the ideal of "participatory" politics. Rouse approves the notion of normative accountability of scientific research but rejects the very idea of the legitimation of science, since it challenges the naturalistic scientific endeavour. Scientific knowledge should not be restricted to any universalistic claims or meta-scientific principles, otherwise are too vulnerable to threats to scientific autonomy and authority. Therefore politics (in a broad sense) is incorporable into scientific practices. Unsurprisingly, Ginev opposes both models of the engagement between science and political sphere, for presumably they irreversibly lead to the destruction of cognitive autonomy of science and hence pose a threat to the democratization processes of modern societies. Yet, Ginev gives us no detail of what are these specifically hermeneutically reconstructable relations of democratization processes and supposed cognitive autonomy and epistemic sovereignty of science. Nevertheless, from all of this we can extract seemingly unshakable "modern" belief that despite epistemic as well as ontological controversies the presence of the Western world as it is proves itself as a virtually inseparable co-existence of *science-democracy-individual*. If one emphasizes the *science-individual* pair of the triplet, one addresses a concept of transhumanism, a nearly theological faith in humanity, or what Fuller calls "a concrete site for entertaining human self-transcendence". By stressing out *science-democracy* pair one captures the depths of cognitive existentialism, or the insight that for science to prosper there is no need of extra-terrestrial capacities, but rather freely-floating interpretations and ideals. Concentrating on the *democracy-individual* pair one experiences posthuman condition, where scientific community, at least in the Rousean vision, disentangles scientific practices from its imaginary subordinate bondage to humans and abandons human-nonhuman confrontation. Conclusively, I will presume that the salient feature uniting these science legitimacy options rests in their nonrepresentationalist flexibility, or what Kenneth J. Gergen calls "a future forming orientation" – a perspective that no longer cares how accurately scientific research represents *what is*, but instead concentrates on *what is to become*.

Koskinen, I.

Epistemic success and societal impact in extra-academic collaboration

Collaboration with extra-academic agents is nowadays common in science. Especially when the aim is to produce practically usable knowledge, and solve pressing problems, stakeholders and extra-academic experts are included in research teams. Various forms of collaborations are being developed in diverse fields; they range from co-research with private enterprises to activist research initiated by stakeholder groups. They however share one goal: increasing the societal impact of academic research. Philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science have examined cases of successful collaborations across disciplinary boundaries and across the boundaries of science. But this literature usually presupposes that success insuch collaborations depends on whether the collaboration succeeds *epistemically*: whether epistemic exchange takes place, whether new findings are made, methods developed, etc. In science policy, however, success in extraacademic collaboration is often taken to mean success in creating *societal impact*: solutions to practical problems, commercializable products, policy-relevant results. There is an implicit assumption that is common in all these literatures: a collaboration that fails from an epistemic point of view, cannot succeed in creating beneficial societal impact. I question this assumption. I illustrate my claim with a case study that serves as a counterexample. I have followed a 2-year project in which the research team consisted of sociologists, artists, and journalists. I attended their research meetings and interviewed all participants, focusing especially on two collaborative phases: in the first the sociologists collaborated with the journalists, and in the second, with the artists. From an epistemic viewpoint, the collaboration between the sociologists and the journalists succeeded: by conducting a survey in a major newspaper they created a boundary object that produced data for the sociologists and was a source of several articles for the journalists. Together they were also able to create a solution to a methodological problem that troubled the sociologists. Considered from the same viewpoint, the collaboration between the sociologists and the artists largely failed. Many of the initial objectives were abandoned, the sociologists and the artists never agreed on certain starting points of the collaboration, and finally the subgroups worked independently without much epistemic exchange taking place. However, if the criterion of success is taken to be the created societal impact, both collaborations succeeded. Both created more public interest in the work of the whole group than would have been likely without the collaboration, and this interest led to policy outcomes. So the societal impact of an extra-academic collaboration does not necessarily depend on whether the collaboration succeeds epistemically or not. I argue that to understand the relationship between epistemic success and success in creating societal impact in extra-academic collaborations, it is necessary to differentiate between different types of societal impact. I then conclude by discussing the possibility of situations in which a collaborative project produces epistemically dubious results but succeeds in creating the wanted societal impact. If such situations are indeed possible, it is particularly important to recognise the looseness of the link between epistemic success and societal impact.

Kourany, J.

Bacon's Promise

At the dawn of modern science, a promise was made. If society would but support the new enterprise, the resulting knowledge would (in the words of Francis Bacon) "establish and extend the power and dominion of the human race over the universe" for the benefit of all humankind. Now, centuries later, has the promise been kept? Science has brought us food in ever greater variety and abundance, but the food is tainted with every manner of pesticides,

herbicides, antibiotics, growth hormones, and other harmful chemicals. Science has brought us more comfortable homes and more convenient modes of transportation and communication, but the costs of these benefits include ever-rising mountains of garbage and toxic wastes and, more alarming still, global climate change. Finally, the benefits that science *has* provided have improved the lot of only some of humankind, not all of humankind. What has gone wrong? It helps to get concrete. In this lecture I consider three areas that have largely failed to deliver on Bacon's promise—chemistry, food science, and biomedical research—and I explore some of the factors that have led to the failure. In the process, I show that common explanations for the failure are woefully incomplete, and I suggest a different explanation together with a different way forward that promises better results.

Lacey, H.

Democracy and methodological pluralism

How can science, and the values incorporated in the tradition of modern science, contribute to strengthen democracy? Answers depend on how democracy and science are understood. I will sketch two conceptions of democracy: *representative democracy* (RDem) and *participatory democracy* (PDem). And, two of scientific research: *decontextualizing research* (DR) (Lacey, 2016) that incorporates "basic scientific" and technoscientific research, including *commercialized science* (CS); and *multi-strategic research* (MS-R), research that allows a pluralism of methodological approaches – or strategies (Lacey, 2016) – so that objects of all kinds can be investigated. It is said that DR contributes to strengthen RDem: that it engenders technoscientific innovations, highly valued in such areas as communications, medicine, agriculture, energy and transport – which enhance the quality of our lives, widen the horizon of our aspirations and open new possibilities for progressively reorganizing societies – and simultaneously strengthens interests that embody values of capital and the market. However, DR *by itself* cannot generate the type of knowledge needed to inform the practices of those, holding values cultivated in PDem, who advocate for widespread popular participation (including of the historically marginalized) in decision-making pertaining to areas (where popular participation rarely is welcomed in RDems), such as the production and distribution of goods and services, the objectives and processes of the workplace, and the types of social arrangements that can exist and flourish. Their practices need to be informed by knowledge obtained under the plurality of strategies permitted in MS-R, not only strategies of DR. Instead of making a general argument for this last claim, I will illustrate its implications for research in agriculture. I will show that DR serves interests that embody values of capital and the market – by means of introducing technologies of, e.g., GMOs and uses of agrotoxics – and (as deployed in CS), since they threaten the viability of the social and ecological conditions required for engaging in agroecology, it does so at the expense of the values embodied in the practices of agroecology. These values (embodied in PDem) include those connected with social justice, strengthening the agency of the marginalized, food sovereignty and environmental sustainability (Lacey, 2015). Proponents of agroecology, on the one hand, challenge the type of production and distribution of agricultural goods that is shaped by agribusiness (with strong support from many RDem governments), the objectives of agricultural production (emphasizing production for export) and the public policies that encourage them, and the creation of conditions in rural areas that undermine those needed for their desired modes of social organization. On the other hand, they are engaged in active, organized struggle to implement agroecology now as widely and rapidly as possible. The practices of agroecology, and those of their struggle, need the input of knowledge obtained under strategies that are part of MS-R and that not reducible to those of DR. To be able to contribute to strengthening PDem, science needs to be interpreted in terms of MS-R.

Louvel, S.

Do funding agencies foster the convergence of the epistemic commitments of scientists? Insights from interdisciplinary nanomedicine in France and in the United States

The calls for tenders of funding agencies foster the creation of communities of expectations (Borup et al., 2006) and communities of opportunities (Molyneux and Meyer, 2009) around a common project. To what extent do they also align the practices and ways of knowing of the scientists funded by the same programs? In other words, do funding programs encourage the creation of a social *milieu* in which scientific teams share conceptions of their work of its relevance, although their specific objects and research questions may diverge? These questions are part of a more global reflection on the consequences of science policies on the ways of organizing and practicing research (Gläser and Laudel, 2016). Competitive project funding is the subject of particular attention, particularly because of its widespread use in OECD countries (Lepori et al., 2007). Social science literature largely focuses on the organizational and professional consequences of competitive project funding, in particular its impact on the autonomy of researchers (Hubert and Louvel, 2012). It is also questioning its epistemic consequences. Social scientists are particularly concerned about the epistemic poverty of project-based research, which can result from risk aversion by evaluators and researchers, as well as from the identification by funding agencies of priority topics or types of science for funding (Gläser and Laudel, 2016, op cit). In this talk, I will adopt a different analysis angle. I will question the influence of funding agencies on the constitution of "epistemic commitments" in research, that is, on certain visions of the relevance of research attached with practices and professional networks (Granjou and Arpin 2015, Granjou, Louvel, Arpin, 2015). I will more specifically analyze how the funding programs for nanomedicine launched in the 2000s in France and the US fostered the constitution of interdisciplinary communities in nanomedicine. Emerging interdisciplinary communities have not stabilized their practices yet. It is therefore interesting to study how institutional commitments such as funding programs contribute to drawing boundaries around these communities and to what extend these programs orient the practices, shared values and objectives of their members. I draw here on a qualitative study (document analysis and semi-structured interviews) which I have conducted between 2011 and 2014 in France and in California. I investigate how the two main objectives for research in nanomedicine defined by national and European funding agencies – 1) technological innovation in the early 2000s or 2) therapeutic discoveries in the mid to late 2000s – favor the formation of common epistemic commitments for researchers in the field. Finally, I also address the following question: what is the strength of these new interdisciplinary commitments encouraged by funding agencies compared to the epistemic commitments of researchers which prevail in their disciplinary communities? I will argue that the first funding programs for nanomedicine –focusing on technological advances– are not prescriptive and only slightly federating. In this approach to project funding, the teams still evaluate the relevance of their research according to the objectives of the scientific disciplines and communities to which they belong and not according to criteria common to nanomedicine and promoted by funding agencies. I will also argue that the subsequent funding programs define nanomedicine as a possible area for therapeutic research. With these programs, nanomedicine becomes a preclinical research tool that has to meet hybrid, scientific, industrial and regulatory expectations. I will show that the funding programs for this type of therapeutic research strongly structure the epistemic commitments of the nanomedicine teams. In fact, these funding programs greatly encourage the formation of networks and organizations that define these hybrid expectations and establish strategies common to researchers in the field. To conclude, funding programs are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for stabilizing and unifying interdisciplinary nanomedicine. Indeed, such a stabilization supposes that these

programs formulate performative expectations, prescribing means of action and scientific directions common to the teams of the field (Pollock and Williams, 2010). Also, nanomedicine is not entirely shaped by the visions of the future proposed by scientific policies. Indeed, research directions given be funding programs do not mechanically align on team practices. They have to materialize in guidelines, objects and applications, which are the product of interactions between scientists and funders, but also regulatory actors and clinicians. Therefore, although the call for tenders seem to target certain types of science, scientists play a key role in defining the research practices "that matter" in nanomedicine (Simakova, 2012).

Pielke, R.

Scientific Authority and Political Myth

In this talk I explore the changing nature of scientific authority in contemporary society. Intellectual elites have of course always wielded a disproportionate influence on politics. A main mechanism of this impact is in the creation of "political myth." In short, political myth refers to a shared narrative of a social group that explains past, present and anticipated political events. Political myths are important because they contain an understanding of the causal mechanisms that are expected to link practical action with desired outcomes. When widely shared, political myth can be invisible. As John Maynard Keynes wrote in 1936, "practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist… it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil." Influential political myths that have escaped beyond the intellectual community to influence broader politics and society include the notion of basic research and the associated linear model of research, the so-called "green revolution" and global agricultural innovation, and the social and political movement focused on human-caused climate change. I'm sure you can think of many others. Ideas really do change the world. Today, I argue, the political influence of scientific authority is about much more than powerful ideas. In this talk I will argue, in exploratory and provocative fashion, that the dynamics of scientific authority have changed profoundly in recent years and decades. Intellectuals no longer influence the world primarily through ideas that shape and become dominant political myths (though to be sure this remains an important mechanism of scientific authority). In addition, the highly-educated have come to be a powerful economic and political force in society. As such, we have come to take on the characteristics common to other interest groups, and unsurprisingly, a focus on self-interests over common interests. In addition to being highly educated, we (and yes, that is us) overwhelmingly vote left, are wealthy, hold "globalist" views and sort ourselves in our social and geographic characteristics accordingly. I will present a broad array of data in support of these assertions, with a focus on the US, but with some comparisons to France and the UK. In an era characterized by populist politics, associated with broad nationalistic, anti-immigrant, authoritarian and anti-intellectual tendencies among significant swaths of the public in the US and Europe, the growing political and social authority of scientists and academics suggests a profound rethinking of our roles in modern society. We need new political myths and mechanisms of mythmaking appropriate for today's world. In this new context, if we are not careful our actions could reinforce the very tendencies that we seek to oppose, and arguably they already have

Radder, H.

Which scientific knowledge is a common good?

In this presentation, I address the question of whether science can and should be seen as a common good. For this purpose, the first section focuses on the notion of (scientific) knowledge and examines its main characteristics. I discuss and assess the core view of analytic epistemology, saying that knowledge is, basically, justified true belief. On the basis of this analysis, I then develop an alternative, multi-dimensional theory of the nature of (scientific) knowledge. Section 2 reviews and evaluates several answers to the question of what to understand by the notion of a common (or public) good. It discusses both economic and socio-political interpretations of this notion. In section 3, I develop an alternative account of the common good of scientific knowledge. This knowledge constitutes a common good if it is both non-exhaustible and in the public interest. The two notions are equally important, but in this presentation the focus is on the former. Some implications of this account for the politics of science are examined by analyzing the theory and practice of product patenting. The main conclusion is a fundamental critique of privatizing non-exhaustible scientific concepts through patenting the products of scientific research.

Reiss, J.

Fact-Value Entanglement and Other Reasons for the Dearth of Uncontroversial Social Scientific Knwoledge

Fact-value entanglement is a ubiquitous phenomenon in the social sciences. To the extent that factual and value judgements are entangled, and there is a lack of agreement on values, disagreement about factual issues is to be expected. But fact-value entanglement is only one of many reasons for the difficulty of social scientists to agree on matters of fact. Others have to do with the complexity and heterogeneity of social scientific phenomena and the limitations of methods of inference to establish their results unambiguously.The aim of this paper is to examine the many reasons for the absence of agreement in the social sciences on matters of fact and to ask, with respect to each reason, about the prospects for addressing it in a way that is likely to command widespread agreement among social scientists. To anticipate my main conclusion: the prospects aren't all that great.

Rieu, A-M.

Science and democracy: the missing nexus

The science and democracy debate has a long history and many different versions. The most influential version is the field of Science-technology-society at the source of Science and technology studies, an interdisciplinary field of research and teaching institutionalized in many different American, Japanese and West-European universities. It associates sociology of science and technology (a field in itself), historical economics, political science and philosophy of science. The search for a nexus between science and democracy is the explicit and tacit core of the science-democracy debate and the STS inter-discipline. The problem in both cases is the absence of an effective nexus between two separate fields, science as a highly specific field of activities and democracy as a type of political regime. This missing nexus explains why the vital question of the relations between science and democracy remains until today an open but endless debate. The objective of this proposal is to introduce a nexus between science and society, which has been introduced by the social sciences, which have focused since the 1980s on the interactions between science and technology and economic progress and social change. Whatever their political presuppositions or ideals, their approach is broader than the science and democracy debate, with a strong political and even policy

impact. This field of research and training is based on two conceptual nexus: the concept of National Innovation System and the Triple Helix concept. Both concepts have strong political implications. The objective is to follow an internal debate of the Triple Helix concept in order to explore how recent research is building a powerful nexus between research, democracy and society. A conclusion will explain why the present geopolitical conjuncture requires a theoretical and political solution and further research

Rodriguez, L.

Scientific ecology in environmental impact assessment: tensions between scientific imperative and deliberative imperative.

In a context of uncertainty and conflicts about ecological issues, environmental impact assessment (EIA) gives rise to a crystallisation of the challenges faced by environmental public action. On the one hand, EIA is meant to properly estimate the environmental degradation caused by development plans or projects, by using the best scientific standards. On the other hand, the relevance of EIA also depends on its ability to suggest strategies to make land use planning compatible with environmental constraints, while guaranteeing democratic processes. The dominant model of EIA in many countries is characterised by the stranglehold of experts on the provision of scientific and technical information. Project managers and experts are supposed to act as neutral agents who provide evaluations for decision makers. This model has at least two weaknesses: it underestimates the complexity of ecological relationships, and it does not take into account the related human dimensions, neither on their social complexity, nor with respect to democratic issues. These constraints suggest that two major conditions are necessary to get a satisfactory environmental public action. First, the expertise ought to be credible, that is to say that it must mobilise reliable and relevant knowledge. Secondly, this expertise ought to be legitimate, which means coming out of a satisfactory process from a justice and equity perspectives. To meet the first condition, knowledge qualified as "scientific" is generally highlighted, to such an extent that Céline Granjou and Isabelle Arpin have noted a "scientific imperative" at stake in environmental public action. In response to the second condition, a deliberative and participatory requirement has emerged in communication and legislation since the 1990's. Loïc Blondiaux and Yves Sintomer have concluded to the emergence of a "deliberative imperative" for public action. Although credibility and legitimacy are both required to a satisfactory public action, scientific and deliberative imperatives appear to be in tension, both in theoretical works about EIA and in practice. In this talk, I lean on a case study including five projects and their EIA, which were undertaken between 2009 and 2015 at Saint-Martin-de-Crau (France). First, I question the theoretical dissociation between scientific imperative and deliberative imperative. Then, I show the lack of evidences of deliberation in EIA, whereas the scientific imperative is dominant. From these results I conclude that, more than a tension, there is an asymmetry between scientific imperative and deliberative imperative in the EIA. I thus suggest a possible way to overcome this asymmetry, by reframing the epistemic and ethical significance of these two imperatives, with a conceptualisation of science for environmental action as a social activity.

Shekeris, H.

CIVISTI and the ideal conversation: A comparison of two modes of setting the scientific research agenda

In this presentation I will defend the thesis that Philip Kitcher's model of the ideal conversation under conditions of mutual engagement falls foul of ideals of equality such as those proposed by Scanlon (1996) and Rancière (2014), and I will present an alternative egalitarian model for setting the scientific research agenda. From the comparison of the ideal conversation with the CIVISTI model – a model originating in a European Union Framework Programme (FP7) project and used in scientific research agenda public consultations – I will identify an underlying tension in efforts of the democratization of the scientific research agenda. I will claim that this tension (and Kitcher's strategy in resolving it) goes all the way back to Plato's criticisms of democracy as a political system of government. More specifically, I will first introduce Scanlon's and Rancière's ideals, before focussing on two features of Kitcher's model of the ideal conversation under conditions of mutual engagement: a) the cognitive condition for mutual engagement and b) Kitcher's position on and occasional advocacy of paternalistic altruism. I will argue that these two features effectively render the ideal conversation inegalitarian and exclusive. As opposed to this, I present a model which has flesh-and-bones deliberators at its heart, both in terms of the proposals made but, more importantly, in the assessment of the quality of the output. In conclusion, I will claim that principles of democratization and the assessment of output quality by parties other than the lay participants (with respect to the setting of the research agenda) pull in different directions and that this reflects wider objections to democracy already present in Plato's *Apology of Socrates.*

Smit, J.

Utility as epistemology: a pragmatist take on science policy

Truth and utility have often functioned as opposites in epistemological and political debates about the governance of science in the post-war Western world. In the name of truth, for example, 'autonomy' and 'pure science' have been defended against the alleged economic emphasis on utility in science policies. But this is a false dichotomy that relies on, and reinforces, distinctions between science and politics as well as knowledge and values. The principal muddiness of these distinctions, both historically and conceptually, has been pointed to (e.g. Kitcher, 2001; Latour, 2004; Douglas, 2009). Still, there exists discontent about the involvement of the state with directing research, discontent about the relevance of scientific studies, as well as discontent about the role of scientific experts in society. By thinking utility *as* epistemology it is possible to criticize limiting forms of science policy as well as pointing towards fruitful directions of democratic governance. In this paper, I will take utility as starting point, rather than an end result, to think the practice and policy of scientific research. First, I take stock of the epistemological functioning of utility in several recent philosophical and sociological accounts of scientific research. This includes for example 'technoscience', 'mode-2 knowledge', and 'responsible research and innovation'. The comparison of utility in these concepts points to the historicity of epistemology and the necessity to situate characterizations of science. Second, I propose to capture this dynamic meaning of utility as (historical) epistemology in a conceptual framework informed by pragmatist philosophies (Dewey, 1938; Stengers, 2010). What if we take the idea seriously that scientific research is a social, material and discursive practice entangled in a democratic society? Utility re-emerges as a fundamental feature of the situation of the research practice (and the researchers) in the world. The alleged extremes of 'pure truth' and 'profit' can both be understood as local manifestations of this general feature of investigative practices. This pragmatist reading of scientific research poses, in new terms, questions to past and current science policies and

funding practices: how did different understandings and manifestations of the utility of science play a part in the process of planning science for the public good – and what consequences for the practice of research did this have? Ultimately, 'utility as epistemology' invites reflections on the historicity and situatedness of science policy and makes us wonder how alternative futures of valuable research are possible.

Wilholt, T.

What Is a University, and Do We Need It?

In this talk, I am going to suggest a contemporary working definition of a university, according to which it is an institution of higher education within which research and teaching are organized and directed at the discretion of individuals who are selected on meritocratic principles according to their academic achievements. Since the nineteenth century, academic freedom thus understood has emerged as a central feature of universities that distinguishes them from other organizations engaged in teaching and research. Do universities in this sense still offer a commendable way of organizing teaching and research in present day circumstances? I am going to discuss two kinds of challenges. The first kind can be stylized as Principal-Agent Problems, according to which university scientists act as agents on behalf of a principal ("the public"), but information asymmetry prevents the principal from effectively controlling that the agents' work is in the public interest. Much of science policy of the last decades can be understood as trying to come to terms with Principal-Agent Problems, and is usually (and often quite explicitly) not based on the assumption that academic freedom provides a way to their solution. A second kind of problem can be summarized as "Unchecked Privilege Problems". The assumption that academic freedom is required to ensure good education and research is based on the idea that it leads to a productive diversity of ideas and to a free exchange of arguments and critique. However, this presupposes that under conditions of academic freedom, different positions have a fair chance of being heard. But university professors, who are the primary beneficiaries of academic freedom, do not adequately represent society in its actual diversity in terms of socio-economic background and class, gender and other aspects of identity. Moreover, principles of academic freedom are also regularly used to protect statements that are apt (e.g. due to their open or concealed misogynic or racist content) to lead individual students to perceive the university as a hostile environment and thereby impair their learning conditions. I am going to discuss whether traditional philosophical justifications of academic freedom (both epistemological arguments and arguments from political philosophy) hold up to the challenges of Principal-Agent Problems as well as Unchecked Privilege Problems.

CHAIRS

Monday 28th, 13h30-15h45…… Sarah Carvallo (Ecole centrale de Lyon)

Monday 28th, 16h05-18h20……Nicolas Lechopier (Université Lyon 1)

Tuesday 29th, afternoon ……Marc Billaud (CRCL, INSERM, CNRS)

Wednesday 30th, 9h-12h20…… Sacha Loeve (Université Lyon 3)

Wednesday 30th, 13h30-16h15……. Elodie Giroux (Université Lyon 3)

INDEX OF PARTICIPANTS

Aguiton, S. *sara.aguiton@ehess.fr*

Bedessem, B. *baptiste.bedessemp@gmail.com*

Billaud, M. *Marc.BILLAUD@lyon.unicancer.fr*

Blatrix, C. *cecileblatrix@gmail.com*

Branch-Smith, T-Y. *teresa.branch-smith@uwaterloo.ca.*

Brown, M-B. *mark.brown@csus.edu*

Carvallo, S. *sarah.carvallo@ec-lyon.fr*

Cayre, A. *acayre@bbox.fr*

Choulet, A. *anais.choulet@gmail.com*

Coutellec, L. *leo.coutellec@u-psud.fr*

Dalibert, L. *lucie.dalibert@univ-lyon1.fr*

Debray, S. *stefanydebray@gmail.com*

Dede, C. *dedecaglar@gmail.com*

Eigi, J. *jaana.eigi@gmail.com*

Fine, R. *renaud.fine@free.fr*

Giroux, E. *elodie.giroux@univ-lyon3.fr*

Guston, D. *David.Guston@asu.edu*

Juozelis, E. *ejuozelis@mruni.eu.*

Koskinen, I. *inkeri.koskinen@helsinki.fi*

Kourany, J. *jkourany@nd.edu*

Lacey, H. *hlacey1@swarthmore.edu*

Lavelle, S. *sylvain.lavelle@icam.fr*

Lechopier, N. *nicolas.lechopier@univ-lyon1.fr*

Leclerc, O. *olivier.leclerc@univ-st-etienne.fr*

Loeve, S. *sacha.loeve@univ-lyon3.fr*

Louvel, S.	*severine.louvel@sciencespo-grenoble.fr*
Lowe, C.	*lowech@uni-osnabrueck.de*
Michalon, J.	*jerome.michalon@gmail.com*
Pielke, R.	*rpielkejr@gmail.com*
Radder, H.	*h.radder@vu.nl*
Reiss, J.	*julian.reiss@durham.ac.uk*
Rieu, A-M.	*amrieu@gmail.com*
Rodriguez, L.	*laura.rodriguez@umontepellier.fr*
Ruphy, S.	*stephanie.ruphy@univ-lyon3.fr*
Shekeris, H.	*haris.shekeris@univ-lyon3.fr*
Smit, J.	*j.p.smit@phil.leidenuniv.nl*
Toraubully, H.	*hanna.toraubully@gmail.com*
Valenzuela J.	*jaime.valenzuela@e-campus.uab.cat*
Wilholt, T.	*torsten.wilholt@philos.uni-hannover.de*
Wuensche, H.	*hannes.wuensche@fokus.fraunhofer.de*